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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
from the post indictment to the post arraignment stage of the criminal pro-
ceedings. The Court held that a voluntary, unsolicited statement made by the
defendant to a police officer, in the absence of counsel, after arraignment fol-
lowing his arrest, was inadmissible. The Court, in Meyer, stated that the
arraignment must be considered the first stage of a criminal proceeding, and
any statement, made thereafter in the absence of counsel, violates the de-
fendant's right to counsel and also infringes upon his privilege against self-
incrimination. In an even more recent case,' 5 the Court stated that interrogation
in the absence of counsel is prohibited after the criminal proceeding had been
commenced. The Court went on to state that it makes no difference if the
criminal proceedings are commenced by a grand jury indictment, or by a
charge placed against the accused by a magistrate after arrest.
In the light of these developments, the question that arises with regard
to the instant case would be-when did the criminal proceedings against the
accused commence? With the benefit of hindsight it would seem likely that if a
case involving the same facts as the instant case were before the Court today,
it would hold that the criminal cause against the defendant had begun. The
defendants had been committed to jail by a court order, and although a formal
arraignment was postponed until the following day, the judicial process had
started in motion. Therefore, it would seem that the statements of the
defendants, obtained during the interrogation following their illegal removal
from jail, would be a violation of their right to counsel and their privilege
against self-incrimination. But this conclusion would only pertain to the facts
of the instant case, that is, where there has been the illegal removal of an
accused from jail, following judicial process. Still the question remains whether
eventually the Court may find it necessary to adopt the exclusionary rule in
the area of illegal detentions. Since constitutional rights now attach at arraign-
ment, it may present a real temptation to law enforcement officials to prolong
further the pre-arraignment period and exaggerate present illegal detentions.
The result is an impingement on these constitutional rights which depend upon
arraignment. The door then is left ajar for the Court to declare through due
process that such impingement requires an exclusionary rule to make effective
the constitutional right to counsel and freedom from testimonial compulsion
already declared to belong to the accused. W. J. L.
CONFESSIONS OBTAINED BY CONFRONTATION WITH ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE
OR AFTER INITIATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
COUNSEL ARE INADMISSIBLE
Prior to arraignment for premeditated murder, defendant was questioned
and made statements implicating himself after being confronted with illegally
obtained evidence. The following day he was brought before a justice of the
15. People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962).
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peace for arraignment, but this was postponed so that an interpreter could be
obtained since defendant did not understand English. Two days later, a few
hours before the actual arraignment, he made a second, similar confession.
Both confessions, made in the absence of counsel, were admitted into evidence,
and the defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed; the Court of Appeals
reversed and ordered a new trial, one judge concurring in result. Held: a
confession elicited without benefit of counsel, after the criminal proceeding has
been commenced, whether it be by grand jury indictment or by a charge
placed before a magistrate following an arrest, is inadmissible in evidence.
Likewise, a confession induced by reason of confrontation with illegally ob-
tained evidence must be excluded. People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183
N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962). 1 Earlier, where a defendant made a
voluntary, unsolicited statement to a police officer after arrest and arraignment
but prior to indictment, although he was informed of his right to counsel but
requested none, the Court held that such a statement was inadmissible as it
"necessarily impinges on the fundamental rights of protection against testi-
monial compulsion, since the jury might well accord it weight beyond its
worth to reach a verdict of guilty." People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182
N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).2
These decisions illustrate that the import of Spano v. New York 3 had not
yet been clearly understood or enunciated. In Spano the United States Supreme
Court held that an involuntary confession was a violation of an accused
person's right under the 14th Amendment and thus inadmissible into evidence
in a state criminal proceeding. The majority commented upon the question of
whether any statement made after indictment, not in the presence of an
attorney, was in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights, but declined
to reach a holding on the ground that it was unnecessary to the decision.4 Four
concurring judges, however, took the position that any questioning of a de-
fendant after indictment, in the absence of counsel, was a violation of the
defendant's right to be represented by counsel. 5 This was also the position
taken by some of the dissenting judges when Spano was at the state level.6
Because of the concurring opinions in Spano, the majority of the Court
of Appeals in People v. DiBiasiF did not feel precluded from holding that
post-indictment statements in the absence of counsel were in violation of a
defendant's constitutional guarantee of right to counsel. Subsequently, in
1. 28 Misc. 2d 736, 218 N.Y.S.2d 177 (County Ct. 1961).
2. 14 A.D.2d 241, 220 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1st Dep't 1961).
3. 360 U.S. 315, reversing 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1959).
4. Id. at 320.
5. Spano v. New York, supra note 3, at 325, 326.
6. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 266, 150 N.E.2d 226, 232, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793, 801 (1958) (dissent-
ing opinion).
7. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960); 10 Buffalo L. Rev. 89
(1960).
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People v. Waterman,8 the Court made it clear that it was laying down a broad
principle and not one to be confined to the special circumstances of DiBiasi,
a capital case. In Waterman the Court also distinguished the seemingly con-
trary holding in People v. Downs,9 on the ground that the testimony of the
accused on trial was substantially the same as the statements introduced into
evidence by the state.
In DiBiasi and Waterman the Court had apparently set the time of the
indictment as the borderline between permissible and non-permissible inter-
rogation in the absence of counsel, as evidenced by its statement that
Any secret interrogation of the defendant, from and after the
finding of the indictment, without the protection afforded by the
presence of counsel, contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the
conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons
charged with crime.'0
The Court did indicate in Waterman, however, that the time of indictment
might not be the dividing line. It noted that a defendant has a constitutional11
and statutory12 right to the assistance of counsel at every stage of a criminal
proceeding and that section 274 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that
an indictment is the "first pleading on the part of the people" and, "where
there has been no preliminary examination, marks the formal commencement
of the criminal action against the defendant" (italics supplied).
Now in Meyer the "hinted at" extension materialized, where the Court
recognized that "in reason and logic the admissibility into evidence of a post-
arraignment statement should not be treated any differently than a post-
indictment statement."' And in Rodriguez a further application was noted.
The fact that arraignment was postponed did not matter since at the first
attempted arraignment the information charging the defendant with the crime
was filed, and this was the start of the criminal proceeding. Thus it is clear that
what is important is not what the particular step is termed but when criminal
proceeding begins.
An interesting approach, however, was used to invalidate the first con-
fession in Rodriguez since the Meyer rule could not be applied to render the
confession inadmissible, as it was clearly made before the initiation of the
criminal proceeding. Instead, the Court chose this occasion to apply Mapp v.
Ohio'4 as excluding not only evidence that is the product or fruit of an illegal
8. 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961); 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 153
(1961).
9. 8 N.Y.2d 860, 168 N.E.2d 710, 203 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
867 (1960).
10. People v. Waterman, supra note 8, at 565, 175 N.E.2d at 448, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
11. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
12. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc., §§ 8, 188, 308, 699.
13. People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427,
428 (1962).
14. 367 U.S. 643 .(1961).
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search and seizure, but also any confession or statement the defendant was
induced to make by reason of confrontation with such illegally obtained
evidence. The Court based this holding on the citation of Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States,25 in Mapp, where the statement was made that "The
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not be used at all."' 6 Judge Froessel, concurring in the result
in Rodriguez, objected to this new New York extension of the Mapp decision
on the ground that the Court of Appeals had always held that the voluntariness
of a confession was a question of fact to be submitted to a jury for determina-
tion,17 and that this rule should not now be changed to render a confession
inadmissible as a matter of law, if the confession is induced by confrontation
with illegally obtained evidence.
In considering the development of the rule prohibiting the use of confes-
sions obtained after the initiation of criminal proceedings in the absence of
counsel, from Spano through Rodriguez, the primary factor in support of the
rule is the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights under the 14th
Amendment. That such a confession is a violation was clearly stated by the
Supreme Court in Spano, and; it is not the intention here to protest this
decision. What is objected to is the seemingly unwarranted, headlong expansion
of this rule by the Court of Appeals. It has been stated many times that the
protection of the rights of the accused in criminal cases must be carefully
weighed against the harm that may be done to society by the hampering of
law enforcement agencies. The development of the rule in question to its present
state seems to have tipped the scale too far against society. According to the
Court of Appeals, a remorseful defendant who wishes to unburden his con-
science must first wait until his attorney finishes his round of golf, changes his
clothes, and drives to the jail to sit by his side before he can confess. Of course
this is an absurd example, but it serves to illustrate that there is a vast differ-
ence between the defendant who is informed of all of his rights and has had the
full benefit of counsel and the defendant who is denied counsel when he requests
or clearly needs it. In the first example society should not be denied the bene-
fits of a confession. In the second the deprivation of one of the defendant's
fundamental constitutional rights should be the primary consideration.
The principle behind the guarantee of counsel was to prevent an accused
criminal from being coerced or acting in ignorance of his rights.1
8 It was not
to prevent an accused from making a voluntary confession when fully aware
15. 51 U.S. 385 (1920).
16. Id. at 392.
17. People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961) (Court
stated that "Admissibility of confessions is a matter of State procedure," citing Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, at 543 (1961)); People v. Vargas, 7 N.Y.2d 555, 166 N.E.2d 831,
200 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1960); Balbo v. People, 80 N.Y. 484 (1880).
18. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, at 69 (1932).
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of his rights. The fact situation should be the controlling factor. This was
recognized by Judge Froessel in his dissent in Meyer where he stated that:
"to hold that admission of a defendant's statements under the particular cir-
cumstances of this case constitutes reversible error will not serve the adminis-
tration of justice."19 Of course, this view may make the determination of the
admissibility of a confession more difficult, but it cannot be alleged that this
should be a controlling factor in a criminal prosecution.
T. C. L.
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING NOTICE HELD SUFFICIENT
WHEN CONDUCT IN GRAND JURY ROOm IS OBVIOUSLY CONTEMPTUOUS
Relator was subpoenaed to appear before the Grand Jury in connection
with its investigation of an attempted murder in Brooklyn. He was questioned
about his activities on the afternoon of the assault but refused to answer on the
ground of self-incrimination. In response to this plea, he was granted immunity;
and the questions were repeated. His replies thereafter were evasive and un-
believable. He was willing and able to relate with considerable detail his activities
during the morning and evening hours of that day, but pleaded lack of memory
concerning his activities during the afternoon. Following his testimony before
the Grand Jury, and on the same day, an application was made by the district
attorney to the County Court to have the relator punished for criminal con-
tempt. The proceedings before the Grand Jury were made known to the Judge,
and he ordered the relator to answer the questions or face punishment. Relator
was taken back before the Grand Jury and was once again questioned con-
cerning his activities at the time of the attempted murder. Despite the Judge's
warning that such replies would be regarded as false and treated as deliberate
refusals to answer, the relator answered only that he did not remember. The
district attorney renewed his motion to punish for contempt and the relator
made his second appearance of the day in County Court. A hearing was held
at which the minutes of the Grand Jury proceedings were introduced as evi-
dence for the prosecution. Relator's attorney made repeated requests that he
be given sufficient time (a few days) to prepare a defense and submit a brief.
These requests were denied, and the relator was sentenced to thirty days in
prison and fined $250. On appeal from the Appellate Division's dismissal of
relator's writ of habeas corpus, held, affirmed, one Judge dissenting. In a
conviction under section 750, subdivision 5, of the Judiciary Law, obtained
through proceedings dictated by section 751 of the Judiciary Law, relator was
given a reasonable time to make a defense, although such time was only
momentary, when relator's contemptuous behavior was patently obvious. People
ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden of City Prison, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 182 N.E.2d 85, 226
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962).
19. People v. Meyer, supra note 13, at 166, 182 N.E.2d at 10, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
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